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1853) made a seminal contribution. 
Using models pioneered for the Indian 
civil service, Northcote and Trevelyan 
recommended a system of independently 
administered service-wide examinations 
as a basis for appointments, backed 
up by transparent, merit-based 
procedures for internal promotion. 
The Westminster model subsequently 
developed a particularly sharp 
distinction between elected ministers, 
who retained responsibility for general 
policy and administration, and politically 
unaffiliated, permanent officials who 
controlled appointments in return for 
loyalty to the government of the day. 
This system, with minor variations, still 
persists in Whitehall, as well as in Ottawa, 
Canberra and Wellington. 
How public servants are appointed 
might seem a relatively minor aspect of 
government organisation when compared 
with, say, the impact that government 
and its agencies have on individual 
citizens and society at large. Why give 
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I would like to begin by thanking the Institute of Public 
Administration for their invitation to deliver this lecture 
as part of their centennial commemorations of the Public 
Service Act of 1912. This act deserves to be remembered 
because it formally enshrined certain values that remain 
fundamental to government but which have not always 
received due recognition from those who comment publicly 
on public service matters.
I
The main thrust of the Public Service Act 
was to establish a unified professional, 
career-based public service. Appointments 
and promotions were to be made 
according to service-wide standards 
and rules administered by public service 
commissioners and free of political 
influence. In making this change, New 
Zealand was not alone but was following 
international trends. All modern western 
governments were in the process of 
reducing the influence of political 
patronage and jobbery on administrative 
appointments by restricting the role of 
politicians and other powerful outsiders. 
In Britain and other British-style 
jurisdictions, the Northcote-Trevelyan 
report of 1853 (Northcote and Trevelyan, 
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so much attention to the selection and 
career paths of officials when what really 
matters is their subsequent performance 
in terms of the objectives we set for 
them? Indeed, if democracy demands 
that governments should follow the 
people’s preferred directions, why go out 
of our way to prevent the citizens’ elected 
representatives from deciding which 
individuals should be given the important 
task of carrying out government policy? 
In practice, however, the values that 
underpin merit appointment to the 
public service, namely the application 
of transparent rules and procedures 
and freedom from political interference, 
have application far beyond the conduct 
of personnel policy. They are also 
fundamental to how public servants 
carry out their main functions as public 
administrators. For instance, when 
providing services to individual members 
of the public, government officials are 
often called on to apply general rules and 
regulations to particular cases. They are 
required to act in strict accordance with 
the rules, without fear or favour, and 
to keep a full and accurate record of all 
procedures followed. If a minister or any 
other politician seeks to intervene on 
behalf of an individual citizen, he or she 
is informed about how the rules apply in 
this particular case and any suggestion 
of special consideration will be politely 
rebuffed. 
This respect for impartiality in the 
implementation of policy is seamlessly 
linked to a similar respect for due process 
in the appointment and promotion of 
government officials. Public servants 
whose employment is grounded in merit-
based procedures will have the same 
respect for procedures when dealing with 
the public. Conversely, officials who owe 
their positions to personal connections 
or patronage will have less compunction 
about bending the rules when dealing 
with members of the public. 
New Zealand is consistently ranked 
among the least corrupt countries in 
the world in which to do business. This 
deserved reputation for high standards 
of impartial and transparent government 
rests on many factors, not least a vigilant 
media and a public opinion intolerant 
of ministers who improperly interfere in 
departmental processes. But we should not 
forget the part played by government’s own 
institutions, including the State Services 
Commission (SSC), the direct descendant 
of the original Public Service Act. The 
SSC continues to perform a vital function 
in protecting the values of a non-aligned 
professional public service, particularly 
at the interface between ministers and 
departmental chief executives. As such, it 
is the envy of other mature Westminster 
democracies (e.g. Aucoin, 2012). In 
Australia, for example, the corresponding 
body, the Public Service Commission, has 
lacked the same role. Under the Howard 
Coalition government it was unable to 
prevent some unfortunate politicisation 
in the appointment of department heads. 
Current revisions to the Australian Public 
Service Act are aimed at strengthening the 
role of the public service commissioner 
but he or she will still lack some of the 
powers of the New Zealand state services 
commissioner. In this context, it is 
disturbing to read a recent proposal that 
the State Services Commission might 
eventually merge with the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Better 
Public Services Advisory Group, 2011, 
p.51). New Zealand should think long 
and hard before it compromises the 
independence of the one central agency 
that focuses on issues of public service 
integrity. 
Public service values of integrity 
and impartiality are important not only 
in making personnel decisions and in 
implementing government policy but 
also in another crucial public service 
role, which is the main topic of this 
lecture, the advising of ministers. The 
advising function tends to be overlooked 
in our recent concentration on managing 
for performance and outcomes. But it 
remains critically important. The State 
Sector Act 1988, for instance, in listing the 
responsibilities of the department chief 
executive, places ‘Tendering advice to the 
appropriate minister and other ministers 
of the Crown’ next after ‘carrying out the 
functions and duties of the department’. 
Indeed, if we go back as far as Northcote-
Trevelyan, we find advising ministers 
named as the first function of permanent 
public servants. Advising, of course, has 
always been a predominantly head office 
task. The majority of today’s public 
servants, who staff the regional offices 
and local branches and who deal directly 
with the public, have little direct input 
into policy advice, although their views 
may be sought from time to time. But 
if advising occupies a relatively small 
proportion of the public service overall, 
it still remains a crucial public service 
function. 
Public service advice takes many 
forms. It includes, for example, practical 
suggestions on how ministers should 
deal with their immediate, daily tasks 
and crises; draft letters in the minister’s 
name replying to the minister’s extensive 
correspondence; and policy papers 
analysing various options for dealing with 
policy problems faced by the minister 
and the government. More broadly, the 
advising function can cover the collection 
of statistics and other relevant data, as 
well the evaluation of existing policies, 
and medium to long-term research into 
issues judged likely to be salient in the 
future. 
Public servants do not have a 
monopoly on providing advice to 
governments. Ministers also listen to their 
political advisers and colleagues, as well as 
to representatives of organised interests 
and to members of the community. 
Policy-relevant research is also carried out 
by other government agencies, including 
... it is disturbing to read a recent proposal that the 
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universities and research institutes, and 
by independent organisations and think 
tanks. Public servants have, however, 
occupied a unique position in the policy-
advising system, combining close access 
to the centre of government decision-
making with a distinctive approach to the 
formulation of advice. 
What sets public service advice apart 
from advice ministers receive from other 
sources? By hallowed tradition, public 
service advice is said to be ‘free and 
frank’. At least, this is the formulation 
favoured in New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, Australia preferring a slightly 
different, though equally alliterative, 
version, ‘frank and fearless’. The label 
implies that public servants are obliged 
to speak their minds openly and honestly. 
They should be willing to tell ministers 
things that ministers may not wish to 
hear. They should not question the 
government’s basic political direction, 
but, within this general constraint, they 
should freely indicate their views of 
how the government’s policy objectives 
can be best achieved, even if this means 
challenging other opinions that ministers 
may hold dear (Mulgan, 2008). 
Being free and frank, in this sense, 
is certainly an important aspect of good 
public service advice, but it should 
not be singled out as the one essential 
characteristic of such advice. Public 
servants are not the only people expected 
to be free and frank in their advice to 
ministers. Ministers also look for the same 
degree of openness and honesty from 
their personal advisers, who comment 
on matters of political tactics and media 
presentation. 
Nor is the value of free and frank advice 
confined to politics and government. 
Leaders as diverse as captains of industry, 
bishops, and vice-chancellors all need 
trusted advisers who will speak their 
minds freely. We should also remember 
that speaking freely and frankly does not 
necessarily require speaking in confidence 
behind closed doors. Newspaper editors, 
for instance, do it openly, as do political 
activists and academics. 
For these reasons, then, free and frank 
advice may be one important aspect of 
public service advice, but, on its own 
at least, it is not the defining aspect. To 
better grasp the distinctive nature of 
public service advice we also need to 
refer to the public service values such 
as impartiality and integrity which we 
have seen to underlie other aspects of 
the public service, such as appointments 
and policy implementation. Compared 
with advice from, say, a media adviser 
or a lobby group, public service advice 
is expected to be scrupulously accurate 
in its factual material, balanced in its 
assessment of evidence, and unbiased in 
its analysis of options. In effect, these are 
intellectual values that are often associated 
with the best scientific or academic 
work – accuracy, objectivity, lack of bias 
and so on. The main difference is that, 
unlike academics and other researchers, 
public servants must always operate 
within a framework which acknowledges 
the government’s right to determine 
directions and make final decisions. 
Unlike academics, also, they often cannot 
afford to delay judgement in the absence 
of definitive evidence. Moreover, even 
when advising in the midst of uncertainty, 
public servants are expected to exercise 
the rational virtues of concern for factual 
accuracy and balanced judgement in the 
weighing of evidence. 
Respect for the intellectual integrity of 
public service advice is a regular feature 
of our political discourse. Ministers who 
wish to vouch for the accuracy of a factual 
statement or the reliability of an argument 
will commonly preface their statements 
with words such as ‘departmental 
statistics indicate’ or ‘as my officials 
advise me’. Opposition politicians, keen 
to score a point against the government, 
will seize on instances where ministers 
appear to have gone against advice from 
their departments. In doing so, they 
are trading on an assumption that the 
department’s view is particularly reliable. 
Safeguarding this reputation is one of the 
main professional imperatives faced by 
senior public servants. If we cannot trust 
the judgement of public servants, then 
whom can we trust? 
Of course, public servants cannot 
think or argue with total objectivity 
or impartiality. Indeed, nobody can. 
But we should not be tempted into 
a shallow relativism which holds all 
opinions to be equally subjective and 
all judgements therefore equally biased. 
Instead, we can talk sensibly in terms of 
degrees of impartiality and reliability as 
interpreted in particular contexts. From 
this perspective, it makes sense to expect 
public service officials to be more reliable 
and judicious than other players in the 
policy-making system. Spokespeople for 
particular interest groups have obvious 
axes to grind, as do many of the so-called 
think tanks. Consultants have incentives 
to please those who have employed 
them and whom they hope will employ 
them again in the future. Politicians and 
their personal advisers are often more 
interested in headlines and opinion polls 
than in serious analysis of policy issues. 
Only public servants have the resources 
of access and information, underpinned 
by professional values of integrity and 
independence, to maintain an impartial 
stance. 
The defining characteristics of good 
public service advice, then, are factual 
accuracy and balanced judgement applied 
to policy issues. We can call this free and 
frank advice if we wish, out of respect 
for well-worn tradition, in the sense that 
public service advice may involve telling 
politicians what they do not want to hear. 
Public servants should not compromise 
their respect for truth and evidence in 
order to accommodate the views of their 
political masters. But, as I have attempted 
to show, it is respect for truth and 
evidence that is the key. 
Public servants should not compromise their 
respect for truth and evidence in order to 
accommodate the views of their political masters.
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II 
Public service advice is facing a number 
of major challenges, both here and 
elsewhere. To begin with, there is a 
perception that the policy function has 
been comparatively neglected within 
government bureaucracies. Two recent 
authoritative reports on either side of the 
Tasman, the Moran report in Australia 
(Advisory Group on Reform of Australian 
Government Administration, 2010) and 
the Scott report in New Zealand (Review 
of Expenditure on Policy Advice, 2010), 
have indicated similar systemic weakness 
in policy performance among major 
government departments, particularly 
in relation to long-term strategic 
policy. Admittedly, any such generalised 
judgement is hard to substantiate and 
performance is clearly varied across 
agencies. Dissatisfaction with the quality 
and depth of departmental advice is a 
longstanding complaint, particularly after 
a change of government. 
Nonetheless, over the last two decades 
or so the advising function and the 
related skills of policy analysis do seem 
to have received less attention than the 
management of government agencies and 
the delivery of government programmes. 
A generation of public sector reform has 
been aimed at improving managerial 
efficiency and effectiveness, primarily 
in the delivery of public services. Policy 
advice and analysis have not been wholly 
forgotten. They have been subjected 
to their own managerial restructuring 
in terms of assessable outputs and 
outcomes, however artificial these may 
be appear. But they have not been the site 
of the main action in terms of innovative 
public administration. For individual 
public servants, as Scott reports (Review 
of Expenditure on Policy Advice, 2010, 
p.51), the path to promotion tends to lie 
through general management. As a result, 
the best and brightest who rise to the top 
in the public service are more likely to 
have made their mark as managers than 
as analysts. 
One major long-term development 
which has affected the standing of 
public service advice is the fact that 
public servants do not have the ear of 
ministers to the same extent as they did 
in previous generations. A number of 
things have contributed to this trend. A 
commonly cited factor is the expansion 
of the number of ministerial advisers, 
understood as members of the minister’s 
office appointed directly by the minister 
and not belonging to the public service. 
Acting as the minister’s eyes and ears, 
these political appointees have enabled 
ministers to extend their influence 
much further over policy and over their 
departments. 
In terms of basic democratic 
principles, such influence can only 
be applauded, as helping to make the 
bureaucracy more responsive to the will 
of the people’s elected representatives. 
When ministers faced the combined 
weight of their departments almost 
single-handed, the balance of power was 
tipped too far towards the professional 
bureaucrats. Indeed, experienced senior 
public servants have welcomed the 
political adviser’s role. They see a sensible 
division of labour between public servants, 
who provide the balanced analysis and 
research, and the advisers, who help with 
the more politically partisan aspects of 
policy making (Eichbaum and Shaw, 
2007; Shergold, 2004). 
Occasional evidence does surface 
of advisers putting pressure on public 
servants to adjust advice to suit the 
adviser’s preferred views, a clear attempt 
to pervert the free and frank expression 
of public service advice. Moreover, the 
fact that advisers increasingly control 
access to ministers can sometimes make it 
harder for senior public servants to get to 
see their ministers in person. If ministers 
are inclined to distrust the loyalty or 
competence of their department, advisers 
provide a ready conduit for relaying 
this distrust. However, generalising in 
this area remains difficult. Whether the 
growth in the number of advisers has in 
itself seriously affected the relationship 
of ministers and departmental officials 
remains a contested issue. In New 
Zealand, at least, research suggests that it 
has not. 
When critics complain of the 
growing influence of advisers they often 
have something else in mind, namely 
the increasing importance of media 
management in the priorities of ministers. 
The ‘24-hour news cycle’, ‘media spin’ 
and the ‘continuous election campaign’ 
have become clichés of contemporary 
political commentary, but only because 
they represent a real and profound change 
in the conduct of democratic politics. 
Successful politicians have always had an 
eye on publicity and public opinion, but, in 
recent times, dealing with the media seems 
to have become an almost overwhelming 
obsession. The speed of the media cycle 
requires constant responses throughout 
the day. The perceived importance of 
frequent opinion polls forces ministers 
to tailor their actions and priorities with 
a view more to immediate media impact 
than to longer-term policy. Ministers are 
therefore thrown more into the arms of 
their media experts and tactical advisers. It 
is not so much that the number of advisers 
has grown, but that their particular role 
has become more dominant. By the same 
token, ministers have less time to consider 
serious policy issues. 
The importance of media presentation 
is a worldwide phenomenon which 
represents a serious threat to the 
influence of public servants and the 
role of robust, impartial policy advice. 
Again, the experience across countries is 
not uniform. Australia, for instance, has 
been suffering from a particularly acute 
dose of the disease, with both sides of 
politics engaged in shallow sloganeering 
to the general despair of the broader 
The perceived importance of frequent opinion 
polls forces ministers to tailor their actions and 
priorities with a view more to immediate media 
impact than to longer-term policy.
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policy community. Relations between 
the previous prime minister, Kevin 
Rudd, and his department secretary, 
Terry Moran, appeared to have virtually 
broken down, with the pair going for 
months without meeting. Senior public 
servants began indicating, with suitable 
mandarin discretion, that ministers, and 
the political class generally, could not 
be trusted to concern themselves with 
careful policy analysis, particularly of 
a more long-term and strategic nature. 
The Moran report itself called for 
the public service to undertake long-
term strategic analysis, on the obvious 
assumption that ministers could not be 
expected to show an interest in anything 
beyond the immediate headline and 
photo opportunity, a not surprising 
assumption given Rudd’s treatment 
of Moran. Around the same time, 
the secretary of the Treasury, Martin 
Parkinson, publicly criticised both 
government and opposition leaders for 
ignoring important economic issues 
facing the country (Parkinson, 2011). 
I cannot comment on the current 
situation in New Zealand. But, if 
worldwide trends are any evidence, getting 
ministers interested in longer-term policy 
is certainly not becoming any easier. 
Moreover, even when ministers do wish 
to consider substantial policy options 
they are not confined to taking advice 
from their public service advisers. In the 
last few decades it has become accepted 
wisdom that the public service no longer 
has a monopoly of the advising function 
and must compete with other potential 
sources of advice, such as consultants, 
think tanks and interest groups. The 
claim is somewhat exaggerated and, like 
most assertions of fundamental change, 
relies on an oversimplified account of the 
pre-existing situation. Governments have 
always made use of external advisers, 
by from time to time commissioning 
independent reports or co-opting experts 
from outside the core public service. 
There is nothing new in that. But in the 
past such external advice was usually seen 
as ancillary and supplementary, and not 
as seriously threatening the dominant role 
of public servants in advising ministers. 
Today, however, that dominance can no 
longer be taken for granted. 
One reason has been the general 
acceptance of outsourcing as a 
legitimate and efficient method of 
meeting government functions. If other 
government services can be contracted 
out to external suppliers, so too can 
the provision of policy advice. Policy 
consulting firms have been one of the 
boom industries over the last quarter 
of a century, often offering expertise 
and political flexibility that is beyond 
the capacity of less nimble government 
departments. 
Also influential has been the growing 
fashion for so-called ‘evidence-based’ 
policy as the preferred method of 
justifying government action. An older 
notion that policy involves a clash of 
interests and values which must be 
negotiated through political compromises 
has fallen out of favour. Instead, policy is 
seen as a more practical and technical 
matter of determining ‘what works’ in 
achieving generally agreed objectives. In 
turn, finding out what works is a matter 
of empirical research and evidence. 
Of course, the notion that politics 
can be sidelined and policy making 
reduced to a technical matter of scientific 
evidence is a delusion. It is yet another 
version of the rationalist fallacy that has 
seduced otherwise intelligent thinkers 
from the time of Plato. Politics has not 
disappeared, but it has been forced 
underground. To appear respectable it 
must now talk the language of the public 
interest and research-based evidence and 
suppress any concern for the interests of a 
particular group. As a consequence, vested 
interests everywhere have put extensive 
resources into providing rational-seeming 
arguments that suit their own preferred 
policy stances. Every major interest 
group employs its own in-house policy 
experts. Think tanks and consultancies 
have mushroomed to meet the demand 
for analyses which will reach the desired 
conclusions in an intellectually plausible 
format. What they are offering, however, is 
often not so much evidence-based policy 
as policy-based evidence: that is, evidence 
selected and presented in a way that is 
favourable to their paymasters’ interests. 
Policy discourse is therefore awash with 
rival policy analyses, all purporting to be 
in the national interest and marshalling 
relevant evidence to suit their position. 
Ministers have many options to choose 
from and are by no means wedded to 
accepting their departments’ own advice. 
Also contributing to a sense that 
ministers and departments are no longer 
joined at the hip is the effect of greater 
transparency of departmental documents 
encouraged by official information (or 
freedom of information) legislation. 
Much of the written advice that public 
servants prepare for their ministers 
now emerges, sooner or later, into the 
public arena and can become a topic of 
public debate. Departments now find 
themselves publicly declaring their own 
openly independent policy stance, which 
may run counter to that adopted by the 
government. 
In some cases, public servants, out 
of traditional public deference to their 
ministers, have tried to avoid such open 
confrontation by keeping controversial 
opinions out of documents that are 
likely to be disclosed. At other times, 
however, departments have welcomed 
the opportunity of publicly pressuring 
their own governments. The New 
[The] degree of openness marks an important shift 
from traditional notions of ministerial responsibility 
in which ministers and their departments presented 
a united front to parliament and the public, 
whatever their internal differences.
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Zealand Treasury was a trailblazer with 
its highly influential briefings published 
after the 1984 and 1987 elections. The 
publication of post-election briefings 
has since become the norm in both New 
Zealand and Australia as a way of trying 
to set a new government’s agenda. The 
general trend to publish departmental 
policy documents is welcomed by open 
government advocates as part of a new, 
proactive policy of disclosure. Publication 
is also claimed to be in the interests of 
government agencies. It allows them to 
put their own views into the public arena 
to counter any misrepresentation they 
may receive from ministers or the media. 
Such a justification is significant 
because it accepts that government 
departments are independent agencies 
with their own preferred policy directions 
which may well differ from those of the 
government they serve. Moreover, it also 
accepts that these differences of opinion 
can be safely revealed to the public. Public 
service advice remains free and frank, but 
this freedom and frankness is now to be 
expressed in public, not behind closed 
doors. This degree of openness marks 
an important shift from traditional 
notions of ministerial responsibility in 
which ministers and their departments 
presented a united front to parliament 
and the public, whatever their internal 
differences. Instead, public servants are 
assumed to face ministers as openly 
independent sources of policy advice 
in a more open and pluralistic policy 
environment, with no guarantee that 
their advice will be adopted by ministers 
or even receive favoured treatment. 
In Australia, this new environment 
was acknowledged recently by the 
incoming secretary of the prime minister 
and cabinet, Ian Watt. He claimed that 
his overriding mission was ‘for the APS 
[Commonwealth Public Service] to be and 
remain the first choice [emphasis added] 
for policy advice, policy implementation 
and program service delivery for 
Australian governments’. In other words, 
the public service cannot assume that it 
will be automatically called on to perform 
its traditional functions, including 
tendering policy advice to ministers. It 
must earn its right to be chosen. A similar 
perspective is adopted in the Scott review 
of public service advice in New Zealand 
(e.g. Review of Expenditure on Policy 
Advice, 2010, p.54). 
There are obvious advantages in a 
more pluralistic system, where public 
service advice competes in a competitive 
marketplace of ideas. Exposing 
departmental research to public scrutiny 
can improve the quality of the research 
itself by opening it up to peer review and 
criticism. Moreover, as the proponents 
of freedom of information argue, policy 
analysis and research conducted by 
departmental public servants should 
be accessible to all political players as 
part of a well-informed democratic 
dialogue. They should not be the 
preserve of incumbent governments to 
disclose or conceal to suit their interests. 
Government information belongs to the 
people not the government and should be 
openly available, subject always to privacy 
and certain other legitimate concerns, 
including protection of national security 
and the judicial process. 
 On the other hand, the new policy-
making paradigm carries certain risks. 
It clearly places ministers in the pivotal 
position of choosing which advice to 
accept from the range of views put 
before them. But how are ministers to 
make such choices? Ministers certainly 
cannot do this on their own but need to 
be assisted by advice – what we might 
call ‘meta-advice, advice on advice’. This 
meta-advice needs to be well-informed, 
politically sensitive, intellectually robust 
and given in confidence. To whom 
should ministers look for such help in 
deciding which policy recommendations 
to follow? If departmental public servants 
are excluded from this meta-advising 
function, who is left? The minister’s own 
political advisers, who generally lack 
political experience and most of whom 
are obsessed with media headlines and 
opinion polls? Paid consultants more 
attuned to what ministers want to hear 
than what they ought to hear? 
Once we ask the question in this way, 
it becomes obvious that professional 
public service advisers ought to be part 
of this confidential inner circle. No doubt 
they are not to be the only members. The 
minister’s personal office has a vital role 
to play, supporting the minister’s political 
priorities, as do other occasional sources of 
advice supported by ministers. But trusted 
public servants have unique resources of 
experience and information to contribute 
in analysing the strengths and weakness 
of policy proposals, including proposals 
from their own departments. The key to 
the effective performance of this meta-
advising function is trust. Ministers need 
to know that their public service advisers 
will be loyal to the government in the 
sense that their advice will be tailored 
to the government’s political agenda 
and that any disagreements will remain 
strictly confidential. In political systems 
as ruthlessly adversarial as our own, 
ministers cannot afford to allow open 
disclosure of internal disagreement over 
policy. 
There is, thus, a clear tension between 
two models of free and frank policy 
advice: an open, pluralistic model which 
places public servants, along with other 
potential players, at arm’s length from 
ministers, and a closed, tightly controlled 
model in which public servants have a 
unique position as privileged and trusted 
insiders. Both models have their place. 
Government information belongs to the people not 
the government and should be openly available, 
subject always to privacy and certain other 
legitimate concerns, including protection of 
national security and the judicial process.  
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There are good reasons for applying 
the open model to policy research and 
analysis carried out within government 
departments, along with similar research 
conducted by independent research 
institutes, in both the public and private 
sector. Here, all the arguments in favour 
of open government and the marketplace 
of ideas clearly apply. The advice can be 
free and frank in the sense of being both 
intellectually robust and not afraid to 
upset ministers. 
On the other hand, when public 
service advice moves into the area of 
clearly commenting on policy alternatives 
and recommending particular options 
to government – i.e. meta-advice – the 
arguments for confidentiality have 
legitimate force as means of safeguarding 
the role of public servants as trusted 
insiders. Free and frank advice in such 
closed contexts is at risk unless serious 
disagreement between ministers and 
public servants is kept confidential. 
III
What, then, are the lessons for the future? 
In the first place, the role of senior public 
servants as trusted insiders needs to be 
acknowledged and protected, as one of 
the enduring strengths of Westminster 
government. This is the original and still 
crucial setting for free and frank advice. 
Ministers need to recognise that their best 
chance of long-term success is to develop 
effective and firmly-based policies, and 
that their best chance of developing such 
policies is to work in close partnership with 
experienced public servants who combine 
impartial judgement with loyalty to the 
government of the day. For their part, 
public servants need to avoid acting in ways 
which could jeopardise their ministers’ 
trust: for instance, by publicly disagreeing 
with the government’s line. On the whole, 
these traditional Westminster conventions 
remain secure in New Zealand, in spite of 
state sector reforms designed to highlight 
different public roles and responsibilities 
for ministers and chief executives (Lodge 
and Gill, 2011; Boston, 2012). But attitudes 
to official information and transparency 
may need some rebalancing towards 
greater protection of the confidentiality of 
politically sensitive advice given by public 
servants, at least for a limited period. 
In Australia, the Freedom of 
Information Act has recently been 
revised to restrict the categories of 
document exempt from disclosure, 
with the specific aim of ruling out 
potential political embarrassment for 
the government as a legitimate reason 
for confidentiality. The change was 
the result of a concerted campaign by 
media interests and the transparency 
lobby aimed at freeing up departmental 
advice that ran counter to government 
decisions. Yet avoiding embarrassment 
for their ministers is a core professional 
imperative for loyal public servants in 
adversarial Westminster systems. Avoiding 
ministerial embarrassment is essential in 
order to maintain the trust of ministers, 
which, in turn, is essential to secure the 
public servants’ place at the nerve-centre 
of government. 
By contrast, the United Kingdom 
Freedom of Information Act allows 
exemption for disclosure of information 
which would inhibit ‘the free and frank 
provision of advice, or the free and frank 
exchange of views for the purposes of 
deliberation’ (Freedom of Information 
Act 2000, s36 2 (b)). But even in the 
United Kingdom, with its stronger 
traditions of executive secrecy, use of the 
government’s power to restrict access to 
controversial advice is proving highly 
contentious. It is almost universally 
condemned by legal experts, academics 
and media commentators. The case for 
confidentiality tends to be written off 
as executive special pleading and not 
firmly grounded, as it should be, in the 
principles of good governance. 
This is not to say that all departmental 
documents should be protected. Much 
data and policy research produced by 
departments should properly be in the 
public arena as part of the public service’s 
free and frank contribution to policy 
debate. Such work does not imply the 
support of ministers; nor need it carry the 
personal imprimatur of the department’s 
chief executive or senior management. 
But when policy advice moves to the frank 
consideration of options and politically 
sensitive recommendations from senior 
public servants, what I have called ‘meta-
advice’, confidentiality should be the 
preferred approach in order to safeguard 
trust-based partnerships with ministers. 
Where to draw the line is admittedly 
difficult and a matter of balancing 
competing principles. The distinction 
between advice and meta-advice is itself 
rough and ready and not capable of 
bearing much weight. One potentially 
useful contrast is between the department 
and its leadership as potential owners 
of advice. The department, as a large, 
collective institution, can afford to have 
its own independent views. The chief 
executive and senior management, 
however, should tread more carefully 
and should think twice before they try to 
influence policy debate through the public 
arena. General reflections on long-term 
issues are to be welcomed, particularly if 
they can be framed in a non-partisan way. 
But comments that reveal a serious policy 
disagreement between a minister and his 
or her chief executive are to be avoided 
because they offer opportunities to the 
government’s opponents and threaten the 
role of senior public servants as trusted 
insiders. 
Apart from its key function in 
confidential advice to ministers, free and 
frank advice is also important in its other, 
more public role as part of the wider 
policy debate. This role, too, needs to be 
protected and encouraged. Such advice, 
it should be remembered, need not 
necessarily emanate from government 
departments under ministerial direction. 
All that is needed is that the researchers 
In political systems as ruthlessly adversarial as 
our own, ministers cannot afford to allow open 
disclosure of internal disagreement over policy.
Page 10 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 8, Issue 4 – November 2012
and analysts should have the right values 
of impartiality and intellectual integrity, 
combined with readiness to speak out 
without fear or favour. Such values are 
more likely to be found in publicly-
funded institutions, particularly in a small 
country such as New Zealand without a 
strong philanthropic tradition of privately 
funding public-interest research. But even 
within the public sector, excellent policy 
analysis can be provided by institutions 
at arm’s length from government. The 
Australian Productivity Commission, 
recently copied in New Zealand, is one 
such successful model. Other research 
institutes and bureaus can also make 
effective use of their independence from 
government and the fact that they do 
not automatically speak for government. 
Universities can also play a part. 
Departments and executive agencies 
should still do their own policy research. 
But if the logic of policy pluralism is 
accepted, they should see their policy 
branches not as the main source of 
government policy, but rather as one 
set of contributors to a wider policy 
debate. Departments do start to frame 
government policy at the later stage 
of meta-advice, which largely operates 
behind closed doors. But in so far as they 
are conducting research and analysis for 
a public audience, there are advantages in 
seeing such advice as preliminary work 
which does not commit the government. 
In this sense, departmental policy and 
research branches could be looked on as to 
some extent arm’s length from ministerial 
responsibility, even though they remain 
formally part of the department. 
The ideal mix of public institutions 
dedicated to free and frank policy 
analysis cannot be prescribed and 
would depend on a number of factors, 
including the type of policy areas and 
the accidental location of good people. 
In general, however, we should accept 
the logical consequences of the fact that 
departments under ministers do not have 
a monopoly of advising. Moreover, we 
should not try to plan too closely. The 
marketplace of ideas, after all, is a market. 
We know, or ought to know, that markets 
cannot be effectively planned. In some of 
the recent reports on policy advice, such 
as those of Scott and Moran, we catch a 
whiff of Stalinist centralism, the besetting 
weakness of those who sit at or near the 
top of central agencies, typically our best 
and finest public servants. They like to 
talk of the need for policy analysis to be 
more ‘strategic’. But ‘strategic’ can be a 
slippery term. Certainly we need more 
strategic analysis in the sense of more 
long-term thinking about major policy 
issues. But the concept of ‘strategy’ can 
also betray its military origins, implying 
a desire for central control from policy 
HQ – which we should avoid. Instead, we 
should listen to the words of another well-
known communist dictator, Chairman 
Mao: ‘let a hundred flowers bloom and let 
a hundred schools of thought contend’. 
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